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Abstract We consider the problem of minimizing costs in the generation unit com-
mitment problem, a cornerstone in electric power system operations, while enforcing
an N-k-ε reliability criterion. This reliability criterion is a generalization of the well-
known N-k criterion, and dictates that at least (1−ε j) fraction of the total system de-
mand must be met following the failures of k or fewer system components. We refer to
this problem as the Contingency-Constrained Unit Commitment problem, or CCUC.
We present a mixed-integer programming formulation of the CCUC that accounts for
both transmission and generation element failures. We propose novel cutting plane
algorithms that avoid the need to explicitly consider an exponential number of con-
tingencies. Computational studies are performed on several IEEE test systems and a
simplified model of the Western US interconnection network, which demonstrate the
effectiveness of our proposed methods relative to current state-of-the-art.
Keywords Integer programming · Bi-level programming · Benders decomposition ·
Unit commitment · Contingency constraints
1 Introduction
Power system operations aim to optimally utilize available electricity generation re-
sources to satisfy projected demand, at minimal cost, subject to various physical
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transmission and operational security constraints. Traditionally, such operations in-
volve numerous sub-tasks, including short-term load forecasting, unit commitment,
economic dispatch, voltage and frequency control, and interchange scheduling be-
tween distinct operators. Most recently, renewable generation units in the form of
geographically distributed wind and solar farms have imposed the additional require-
ment to consider uncertain generation output, increasingly in conjunction with the
deployment of advanced storage technologies such as pumped hydro. Growth in sys-
tem size and the introduction of significant generation output uncertainty contribute
to increased concerns regarding system vulnerability. Large-scale blackouts, such as
the Northeast blackout of 2003 in North America and, more recently, the blackout
of July 2012 in India, impact millions of people and result in significant economic
costs. Similarly, failure to accurately account for renewables output uncertainty can
lead to large-scale forced outages, as in the case of ERCOT on February 26, 2008.
Such events have led to an increased focus on power systems reliability, with the goal
of mitigating against failures due to both natural causes and intelligent adversaries.
Optimization methods have been applied to power system operational problems
for several decades; Wood and Wollenberg [30] provide a brief overview. The cou-
pling of state-of-the-art implementations of core optimization algorithms (including
simplex, barrier, and mixed-integer branch-and-cut algorithms) and current comput-
ing capabilities (e.g., inexpensive multi-core processors) enable optimal decision-
making in real power systems. One notable example involves the unit commitment
problem, which is used to determine the day-ahead schedule for all generators in a
given operating region of an electricity grid. A solution to the unit commitment prob-
lem specifies, for each hour in the scheduling horizon (typically 24 hours), both the
set of generators that are to be operating and their corresponding projected power
output levels. The solution must satisfy a large number of generator (e.g., ramp rates,
minimum up and down times, and capacity limits) and transmission (e.g., power flow
and thermal limit) constraints, achieving a minimal total production cost while sat-
isfying forecasted demand. The unit commitment problem has been widely studied,
for over three decades. For a review of the relevant literature, we refer to [13] and
the more recent [21]. Many heuristic (e.g., genetic algorithms, tabu search, and simu-
lated annealing) and mathematical optimization (e.g., integer programming, dynamic
programming, and Lagrangian relaxation) methods have been introduced to solve
the unit commitment problem. Until the early 2000s, Lagrangian relaxation methods
were the dominant approach used in practice. However, mixed-integer programming
implementations are either currently in use or will soon be adopted by all Independent
System Operators (ISOs) in the United States to solve the unit commitment problem
[9].
Security constraints (i.e., which ensure system performance is sustained when
certain components fail) in the context of unit commitment are now a required regu-
latory element of power systems operations. The North American Electric Reliability
Corporation (NERC) develops and enforces standards to ensure power systems reli-
ability in North America. Of strongest relevance to security constraints for unit com-
mitment is the NERC Transmission Planning Standard (TPL-001-0.1, TPL-002-0b,
TPL-003-0b, TPL-004-0a, [18]). The TPL specifies 4 categories of operating states,
labeled A through D. Category A represents the baseline “normal” state, during which
Contingency-Constrained Unit Commitment with Post-Contingency Corrective Recourse 3
there are no system component failures. Category B represents so called N-1 contin-
gency states, in which a single system component has failed (out of a total of N com-
ponents, including generators and transmission lines). NERC requires no loss-of-load
in both categories A and B, which collectively represent the vast majority of observed
operational states. Categories C and D of the TPL represent more extreme states, in
which multiple system components fail (near) simultaneously. Large-scale blackouts,
typically caused by cascading failures, are Category D events. Such failure states are
known as N-k contingencies in the power system literature, where k (k ≥ 2) denotes
the number of component failures. In contrast to categories A and B, the regulatory
requirements for categories C and D are vaguely specified, e.g., “some” loss of load
is allowable, and it is permissible to exceed normal transmission line capacities by
unspecified amounts for brief time periods.
The computational difficulty of security-constrained unit commitment is well-
known, and is further a function of the specific TPL category that is being consid-
ered. The unit commitment problem subject to N-1 reliability constraints is, given
the specific regulatory requirements imposed for category B events of the TPL, ad-
dressed by system operators worldwide. However, we observe that it is often solved
approximately in practice, specifically in the context of large-scale (ISO-scale) sys-
tems [20]. For example, a subset of contingencies based on a careful engineering
analysis is often used to obtain a computationally tractable unit commitment prob-
lem. Alternatively, the unit commitment problem can be solved without considering
contingencies, and the solution can be subsequently “screened” for validity under a
subset of contingencies (again identified by engineering analysis). Additional con-
straints can then be added to the master unit commitment problem, which is then
resolved; the process repeats until there is no loss-of-load in the contingency states.
We raise this issue primarily to point out that even the full N-1 problem is not consid-
ered a “solved” problem in practice, such that advances (including those introduced
in this paper) in the solution of unit commitment problems subject to general N-k
reliability constraints can potentially impact the practical solution of the simpler N-1
variant.
Numerous researchers have introduced algorithms for solving both the security-
constrained unit commitment problem and the simpler, related problem of security-
constrained optimal power flow. In the latter, the analysis is restricted to a single
time period, and binary variables relating to generation unit statuses are fixed based
on a pre-computed unit commitment schedule. [4] provides a recent review of the
literature on security-constrained optimal power flow. Of specific relevance to our
work is the literature on security-constrained optimal power flow in situations where
large numbers of system components fail. This literature is mostly based on worst-
case network interdiction analysis and includes solution methods based on bi-level
and mixed-integer programming (see [24,25,1,8,33,32]) and graph algorithms (see
[22,3,8,15,16]).
Following the Northeast US blackout of 2003, significant attention was focused
on developing improved solution methods for the security-constrained unit commit-
ment problem. In particular, various researchers introduced mixed-integer program-
ming and decomposition-based methods for more efficiently enforcing N-1 reliabil-
ity, e.g., see [10,11,28,17,12,19]. However, due to its computational complexity,
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security-constrained unit commitment considering the full spectrum of NERC relia-
bility standards has not attracted a comparable level of attention until very recently.
Specifically, [26] and [29] consider the case of security-constrained unit commitment
under the more general N-k reliability criterion. Similarly, [26,27] and [29] use robust
optimization methods for identifying worst-case N-k contingencies.
In this paper, we extend the N-k reliability criterion to yield the more general
N-k-ε criterion. This new criterion dictates that for all contingencies of size j, j ∈
{1, · · · ,k}, at least (1− ε j) fraction of the total demand must be met, with ε j ∈ [0,1]
and ε1 ≤ ε2 ≤ ·· · ≤ εk. The primary motivation for introducing this metric is that it
provides a practical and quantifiable bound on system performance under Categories
C and D TPL contingencies, and can easily be expressed in mathematical optimiza-
tion models. We refer to the security-constrained unit commitment problem subject
to N-k-ε reliability as the contingency-constrained unit commitment (CCUC) prob-
lem. In the CCUC, all contingencies with k or fewer element failures (generation
units or transmission lines) are implicitly considered when checking for the feasibil-
ity of post-contingency corrective recourse. The CCUC is formulated as a large-scale
mixed-integer linear program (MILP). To solve the CCUC, we develop two decom-
position strategies: one based on a Benders decomposition [2], and another based
on cutting planes derived from the solution of power system inhibition problems [6,
7]. We then show the computational effectiveness of our algorithms on a range of
benchmark instances.
Our specific contributions, as detailed in this paper, include:
– We ensure the existence of a feasible post-contingency corrective recourse, taking
into consideration generator ramping constraints and the no-contingency (nomi-
nal) state economic dispatch;
– We consider the loss of both generation units and transmission lines;
– We propose novel decomposition methods to solve the contingency-constrained
CCUC efficiently, and show that models and methods proposed by [12], [19],
[26], [27], and [29] are all special cases of our general approach.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate
the MILP model for the contingency-constrained unit commitment problem under
the N-k-ε reliability criterion. In Section 3, two approaches based on decomposition
methods are presented for solving this large-scale MILP. In Section 4, we test our
algorithms on several IEEE test systems and a simplified model of the Western in-
terconnection. Finally, we conclude in Section 5 with a summary of our results and
directions for future research.
2 Problem Formulation
This section presents our mixed-integer linear programming model for the contingency-
constrained unit commitment (CCUC) problem. In Table 1, we introduce the core
sets, parameters, and decision variables of the model. The baseline unit commitment
formulation, without contingency constraints, is described in Section 2.1. We dis-
cuss key concepts involving N-k-ε contingency analysis in Section 2.2, which are
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Table 1 Nomenclature
Sets and Indices
I Set of buses. Indexed by i for individual buses, i and j for pairs of buses.
I Number of buses. I = |I |.
G Set of generation units. Indexed by g.
G Number of generation units. G= |G |.
Gi Set of generation units located at bus i ∈I .
E Set of directed transmission lines connecting pairs of buses. Indexed by e.
E Number of transmission lines. E = |E |.
E.i Set of transmission lines oriented into bus i ∈I .
Ei. Set of transmission lines oriented out of bus i ∈I .
ie, je Tail bus ie and head bus je of transmission line e ∈ E .
T Set of time periods in the planning horizon. Indexed by t ∈ {1,2, · · · ,T}.
(I ,G ,E ) triple that defines a power system.
Parameters
Be, Fe Susceptance and power flow (i.e., thermal) limit of transmission line e.
Dti Demand (load) at bus i ∈I at time t.
Dt = ∑
i∈I
Dti Total demand, summed across all buses, in period t.
Pming , P
max
g Lower/upper limits on power output for generation unit g.
T d0g , T
u0
g Minimum time period generation unit g ∈ G must be initially offline/online.
T dg , T
u
g Minimum time period generation unit g ∈ G must remain offline/online once the unit
is shut down/started up.
Rdg ,R
u
g Maximum ramp-down and ramp-up rate for generation unit g ∈ G between adjacent
time periods.
R˜dg , R˜
u
g Maximum shutdown/startup ramp rates for generation unit g ∈ G for the time period
in which g is turned off/on.
Cug ,C
d
g Fixed startup/shutdown cost for generation unit g.
Cpg (·) Production cost function for generation unit g.
Variables
xtg Binary variable indicating if a generation unit g ∈ G is committed (xtg = 1) or not
(xtg = 0) at time t.
xt Unit commitment decision vector for all generation units at time t.
x G×T unit commitment decision vector for all generation units over all time periods.
cutg ,c
dt
g Incurred startup/shutdown cost for a generation unit g ∈ G at time t (if unit g is started
up or shut down at time t, the respective costs are Cug and C
d
g . Otherwise, C
u
g =C
d
g = 0.)
p˜tg No-contingency state power output by generation unit g at time t.
f˜ te No-contingency state power flow on transmission line e at time t.
θ˜ ti No-contingency state phase angle at bus i at time t.
subsequently illustrated on an example in Section 2.3. Finally, we combine the base-
line unit commitment model with N-k-ε contingency analysis in Section 2.4, for our
contingency-constrained unit commitment model.
2.1 The Baseline Unit Commitment Model
We now present our baseline unit commitment (BUC) formulation, without contin-
gency constraints. Our formulation is based on the mixed-integer linear programming
UC formulations introduced by [5,31,34]. We extend these formulations to capture
network transmission constraints, in the form of a DC power flow model. Our BUC
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model is intended to reflect steady-state operational conditions, such that the system
is in a no-contingency state. Consequently, we require that the demand at each bus
i ∈I must be fully satisfied, i.e., no loss-of-load is allowed.
Our BUC formulation for a power system (I ,G ,E ) is given as follows:
min
x ∑
t∈T
∑
g∈G
(cutg + c
dt
g )+Q(x) (1a)
s.t.
T u0g
∑
t=1
(1− xtg) = 0 ∀g ∈ G (1b)
T d0g
∑
t=1
xtg = 0 ∀g ∈ G (1c)
t+T ug −1
∑
t ′=t
xt
′
g ≥ T ug (xtg− xt−1g ) ∀g ∈ G , t = T u0g +1, · · · ,T −T ug +1 (1d)
T
∑
t ′=t
(
xt
′
g − (xtg− xt−1g )
)≥ 0 ∀g ∈ G , t = T −T ug +2, · · · ,T (1e)
t+T dg −1
∑
t ′=t
(1− xt ′g )≥ T dg (xt−1g − xtg) ∀g ∈ G , t = T d0g +1, · · · ,T −T dg +1 (1f)
T
∑
t ′=t
(
(1− xt ′g )− (xt−1g − xtg)
)≥ 0 ∀g ∈ G , t = T −T dg +2, · · · ,T (1g)
cutg ≥Cug(xtg− xt−1g ) ∀g ∈ G , t ∈T (1h)
cdtg ≥Cdg (xt−1g − xtg) ∀g ∈ G , t ∈T (1i)
cutg ,c
dt
g ≥ 0 ∀g ∈ G , t ∈T (1j)
xtg ∈ {0,1} ∀g ∈ G , t ∈T (1k)
The optimization objective (1a) is to minimize the sum of the startup costs cutg ,
shutdown costs cdtg , and generation cost Q(x). Constraints (1b) - (1k) include (in
order): initial online requirements for generating units (1b); initial offline require-
ments for generating units (1c); minimum online constraints in nominal time peri-
ods for generating units (1d); minimum online constraints for the last T ug time peri-
ods (1e); minimum offline constraints in nominal time periods for generating units
(1f); minimum offline constraints for the last T dg time periods (1g); startup cost com-
putation (1h); shutdown cost computation (1i); non-negativity for startup/shutdown
costs (1j); and binary constraints for the on/off status of generating units (1k). For
clarity of exposition and conciseness, we define the set X given by X = {x ∈
{0,1}G×T | constraints (1b)− (1k)}.
The minimum generation costQ(x), given a unit commitment x is constrained by
a combination of DC power flow constraints and unit ramping constraints, as follows:
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Q(x) = min
f˜,p˜,θ˜
∑
g∈G
∑
t∈T
Cpg (p˜
t
g) (2a)
s.t. ∑
g∈Gi
p˜tg+ ∑
e∈E.i
f˜ te− ∑
e∈Ei.
f˜ te = D
t
i ∀i ∈I ,∀t ∈T
(2b)
Be(θ˜ tie − θ˜ je)t − f˜ te = 0 ∀e ∈ E ∀t ∈T
(2c)
−Fe ≤ f˜ te ≤ Fe ∀e ∈ E ,∀t ∈T
(2d)
Pming x
t
g ≤ p˜tg ≤ Pmaxg xtg ∀g ∈ G ,∀t ∈T
(2e)
p˜tg− p˜t−1g ≤ Rugxt−1g + R˜ug(xtg− xt−1g )+Pmaxg (1− xtg) ∀g ∈ G ,∀t ∈T
(2f)
p˜t−1g − p˜tg ≤ Rdgxtg+ R˜dg(xt−1g − xtg)+Pmaxg (1− xt−1g ) ∀g ∈ G ,∀t ∈T
(2g)
The optimization objective (2a) is to minimize generation cost given a unit com-
mitment x, where Cpg (p˜tg) is a linear approximation of generation cost for thermal
units, as is commonly employed. We discuss this linearization further below. Con-
straints (2b)-(2g) constitute an optimal power flow formulation, and include (in or-
der): power balance at each bus (2b); power flow on a line, proportional to the dif-
ference in voltage phase angles at the terminal buses (2c); transmission line capacity
limits (2d); lower and upper bounds for committed generation unit output levels (2e);
and generation ramp-up/ramp-down constraints for pairs of consecutive time periods
(2f) and (2g).
By linearizing the generation cost functions, (1)-(2) provides a mixed-integer lin-
ear programming (MILP) formulation of the unit commitment problem with trans-
mission constraints, but without contingency constraints. A solution to the BUC pro-
vides an on/off schedule for all generation units, over all time periods in the horizon
T . In practice, committed generation units are adjusted on an hourly or sub-hourly
basis, by ramping up or down specific units in order to satisfy realized demand. Fur-
ther, additional fast-reaction (i.e., “peaker”) units can be brought online if necessary.
However, this process occurs on a different time scale than the BUC, i.e., one or two
hours prior to real-time execution.
Remark 1 Our BUC model most closely represents the reliability unit commitment
problem, which ISOs and vertically integrated utilities solve every night. In contrast,
the day-ahead unit commitment problem is executed earlier in the day, and is used to
clear the market and set nodal electricity prices. While there are differences between
the two problem variants, specifically in terms of the inputs (e.g., bids driving aggre-
gate demand, in contrast to ISO-forecasted load), the basic BUC model can be easily
re-cast into either variant.
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Remark 2 The number of time periods that unit g has been online/offline prior to
t = 1 should satisfy T u0g ×T d0g = 0. That is, if a unit g is online prior to time period 1,
T u0g ≥ 0 and T d0g = 0. Similarly, if unit g is offline before time period 1, T u0g = 0 and
T d0g ≥ 0.
Remark 3 The structure of the BUC solution space is known to be degenerate, due to
the nature of the phase angles θ˜ ti . In particular, alternative optimal solutions can be
obtained by shifting all of the θ˜ ti of a given optimal solution by a constant factor. To
mitigate this degeneracy, and following common practice in the literature, we require
in our numerical experiments that the value θ˜ tr for a pre-defined “reference” bus r be
equal to 0 for t ∈T .
Remark 4 Generation cost curves Cpg (ptg) are generally specified as quadratic func-
tions of the form: Cpg (ptg) = c
p2
g (ptg)
2 + cp1g ptg+ c
p0
g . However, because the C
p
g (ptg)
are non-decreasing convex functions of ptg, they can be easily approximated using a
piecewise linear function (see [5]). Many researchers make a further simplification
by assuming a linear cost function, which corresponds to the not uncommon case in
which a generator offers into the market with a single marginal cost factor. We make
this assumption below in our numerical experiments, specifically thatCpg (ptg) = c
p
g ptg.
The extension to the more general piecewise construct discussed above is straight-
forward, and does not impact the algorithms we introduce in Section 3. Practically,
piecewise constructs would inflate the solve times, but not significantly.
Remark 5 Variables and constraints to capture reserve requirements are common in
the unit commitment literature, but are absent in our unit commitment models. As
noted in [12][p. 1056], “The primary purpose of spinning and non-spinning reserves
is to ensure there is enough capacity online to survive a contingency”. Hedman et
al. [12] make this argument in the context of N-1 reliabiliy; the argument for the
exclusion of reserve models is even stronger for N-k contingencies. Reserves, specif-
ically spinning reserves, also serve as proxies for explicitly dealing with uncertainty
in demand and variable generation (e.g., wind and solar plant) output. However, again
following [12], we argue that enforcing N-k reliability (even when k = 1) is likely to
ensure sufficient spinning reserves are online to deal with forecast errors in both de-
mand and variable generation. We demonstrate that this is indeed the case in Section
2.3 by analyzing the CCUC for a 6-bus system.
2.2 N-k-ε Contingency Constraints for Reliability Requirements
According to the NERC TPL standard, in the event of a loss involving a single com-
ponent (i.e., an N-1 contingency), a power system must remain stable and satisfy all
demand. In the case of two or more simultaneous losses (i.e., an N-k contingency with
k≥ 2), the system must maintain stability; however, a pre-planned or controlled loss-
of-load is allowed. Therefore, prior to analyzing the contingency-constrained unit
commitment problem, we must first ensure that the BUC model can yield solutions
that satisfy such requirements.
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We consider the loss of elements in a power system (I ,G ,E ) in both the set G of
generating units and the set E of transmission lines. The parameters and the variables
in our formulation are defined in Table 2.
Table 2 Variables and parameters N-k-ε contingency analysis
Parameters
k Maximum number of simultaneous element failures.
C ( j) Set of all contingencies with exactly j failed generation units
and/or transmission lines for j ∈ {1, · · · ,k}. Indexed by c.
|c| Size of contingency c, i.e., the number of failed elements.
C = ∪kj=1C ( j): Set of all contingencies with k or fewer failed elements (generation
units and/or transmission lines). |C |=C.
d˜cg ∈ {0,1} Parameter specifying whether generation unit g ∈ G is involved in
contingency c ∈ C .
d˜ce ∈ {0,1} Parameter specifying whether transmission line e ∈ E is involved in
contingency c ∈ C .
d˜c ∈ {0,1}G+T Vector that is the concatenation of dcg ∀g ∈ G and dce ∀e ∈ E .
ε j Parameter indicating the maximum fraction of total system load that
can be shed in a size j contingency state, for j = 1, · · · ,k.
ε Parameter vector indicating the maximum fraction of total load
that can be shed for each contingency size, ε = (ε1, · · · ,εk).
∆ jg Multiplicative factor applied to the ramping limits of generator g ∈ G
during a size j ∈ {1, · · · ,k} contingency (∆ jg ≥ 1).
∆ je Multiplicative factor applied to the power flow limits of transmission
line e ∈ E during a size j ∈ {1, · · · ,k} contingency (∆ je ≥ 1).
Variables
pctg , f
ct
e ,θ cti corresponding values of p˜
t
g, f˜
t
e , θ˜ ti during contingency c ∈ C .
qcti Loss-of-load amount during contingency c at bus i at time t.
We express the N-k contingency set C as follows:
C =
{
d˜c :
(
∑
g∈G
d˜cg+ ∑
e∈E
d˜ce
)
≤ k
}
. (3)
Remark 6 The number of contingencies within the set C is then given by:(
G+E
1
)
+ · · ·+
(
G+E
k
)
≤ (G+E+1)k−1.
Practically, the number of contingencies grows so rapidly that explicit enumeration-
based approaches are almost certain to fail even for modestly-sized systems.
We assume that a given contingency c holds for all time periods t ∈ T . Or al-
ternatively, a power system must be N-k-ε compliant in all time periods t ∈ T , for
all contingencies c ∈ C . We are not modeling specific issues relating to when a con-
tingency may occur, how long it may last, and what corrective measures may be
taken to restore functionality. Such issues can significantly expands the size and dif-
ficulty of the associated unit commitment problem, and is beyond the scope of this
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work. Further, generation costs are not optimized in post-contingency operation; fol-
lowing precedence in the literature, only constraints related to power flow on the
non-contingency system elements must be enforced. In other words, the primary goal
during a contingency state is operational feasibility and not cost minimization. Addi-
tionally, multiple failure contingencies are extreme events with correspondingly low
occurrence probabilities. Therefore, consideration of the cost of these extreme events
during operations planning is unnecessary, and may result in prohibitively expensive
operations.
Given these assumptions, we formulate the post-contingency corrective recourse
constraints (i.e., the constraints that must be satisfied as the system state is altered in
response to a contingency event, starting from a given steady state) R(x, p˜, d˜c) for
a contingency prescribed by d˜c, under a unit commitment decision vector x and the
no-contingency state generation schedule p˜ as follows:
R(x, p˜, d˜c) : ∑
g∈Gi
pctg + ∑
e∈E.i
f cte − ∑
e∈Ei.
f cte +q
ct
i = D
t
i ∀i ∈I ,∀t ∈T (4a)
Be(θ ctie −θ ctje )(1− d˜ce)− f cte = 0 ∀e ∈ E ,∀t ∈T (4b)
−Fe∆ |c|e (1− d˜ce)≤ f cte ≤ Fe∆ |c|e (1− d˜ce) ∀e ∈ E ,∀t ∈T (4c)
pctg ≤ Pmaxg xtg(1− d˜cg) ∀g ∈ G ,∀t ∈T (4d)
pctg ≤ Rug∆ |c|g + p˜tg ∀g ∈ G ,∀t ∈T (4e)
− pctg ≤ (Rdg∆ |c|g − p˜tg)(1− d˜cg) ∀g ∈ G ,∀t ∈T (4f)
qcti ≤ Dti ∀i ∈ I,∀t ∈T (4g)
∑
i∈I
qcti ≤ ε|c|Dt ∀t ∈T (4h)
pctg ≥ 0 ∀g ∈ G ,∀t ∈T (4i)
qcti ≥ 0 ∀i ∈I ,∀t ∈T . (4j)
Constraints (4a) enforce power balance at each bus, leveraging additional loss-of-
load variables qct . Constraints (4b) enforce DC power flow on those lines that are not
part of contingency d˜c . Constraints (4c) enforce transmission line capacity limits.
If a line is not part of a contingency, then the power flow limit is given by Fe∆
|c|
e ;
otherwise, the power flow is constrained to equal zero. Constraints (4d) enforce up-
per bounds on power output of committed (or “on”) generation units not involved
in the contingency d˜c; otherwise, the power output is constrained to equal to zero.
Constraints (4e) enforce generator ramp-up constraints. If a generation unit is part
of the contingency, then its corresponding power output level during the contingency
is zero (pctg = 0) and the constraint is non-binding. Otherwise, a generator can only
ramp-up by Rug from its pre-contingency level. Similarly, constraints (4f) enforce gen-
eration ramp-down constraints. If a generation unit is involved in a contingency, then
(1−dcg) = 0 and the ramp-down constraint is non-binding. Otherwise, a generator can
only ramp-down by Rdg from its pre-contingency level. Constraints (4g) ensure that
loss-of-load at each bus does not exceed the demand at that bus. Finally, constraints
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Table 3 Generator data for the 6-bus test system
Unit Bus Prod. Start- Pmax Pmin Ramp
No. ($/MW) up ($) (MW) (MW) (MW/h)
G1 1 13.51 125 220 100 55
G2 2 32.63 249 100 10 50
G3 6 17.69 0 100 10 20
G4 1 42 50 100 0 50
G5 2 42 50 100 0 50
G6 6 42 50 100 0 50
(4h) ensure that at most ε|c| fraction of the aggregate demand can be shed in a size |c|
contingency.
Observe that in (4), lower limits on power output for generation units not in the
contingency are relaxed to ensure sufficient operational flexibility. These lower limits
can be easily incorporated for systems with sufficiently flexible generation units. In
addition, we implicitly assume that the on/off state of generation units not involved
in a contingency are fixed and cannot be changed via recourse variables during the
contingency. For those generation units that are not involved in the contingency, the
power output levels pct are not allowed to deviate from the baseline (pre-contingency)
power output levels p˜tg beyond the interval [p˜
t
g−Rdg , p˜tg+Rug], given physical ramping
limitations.
2.3 A 6-Bus Illustrative Example
We now examine the impact of contingency constraints on optimal BUC solutions us-
ing the 6-bus test system introduced in [10]-[11]. Our goals are to concretely illustrate
(a) the often significant changes in solution structure induced by the requirements to
maintain N-k-ε in unit commitment, relative to the baseline and N-1 cases, and (b) the
redundant nature of contingency constraints, in that satisfaction of one contingency
state yields solutions that can “cover” many other contingency states. The original
test system consists of 6 buses, 7 transmission lines, and 3 generating units. We mod-
ified this instance for purposes of our analysis as follows. We augmented the system
with three additional, fast-ramping generators G4, G5, and G6, located at buses 1, 2,
and 6, respectively. This modification ensures there is sufficient generation capacity
to satisfy the N-k-ε criterion during contingency states. Data for the original genera-
tor set and the three additional generators is summarized in Table 2.3. Transmission
line data is summarized in Table 4.
Consistent with [10]-[11], the unit shutdown cost is negligible and assumed to be
zero in our analysis. For illustrative purposes, we only consider the BUC with a single
time period, with loads of 51.2, 102.4, and 42.8 at buses 3, 4, and 5, respectively.
Runtime results for the full 24-hour instance are presented in Section 4.
A single line diagram of the 6-bus test system is shown in Figure 1(a). Generator
capacity bounds, transmission line capacity bounds, and loads are shown adjacent to
their corresponding system elements. When contingencies are ignored, the optimal
BUC solution commits a single unit (G1 at bus 1), generating 196.4 MW to meet the
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Table 4 Transmission line data for the 6-bus test system
Line From To Be Fe
No. Bus Bus (MW)
L1 1 2 5.88 200
L2 1 4 3.88 100
L3 2 4 5.08 100
L4 5 6 7.14 100
L5 3 6 55.56 100
L6 2 3 27.03 100
L7 4 5 27.03 100
2	  
3	  
4	  
5	  6	  
1	  
102.4	  
42.8	  
51.2	  
G2:	  (10,	  100)	  
G5:	  (0,	  100)	  
G1:	  (100,	  220)	  
G4:	  (0,	  100)	  
G3:	  (10,	  100)	  
G6:	  (0,	  100)	  
±200	  
±100	  
±100	  ±
10
0	  
±1
00
	  
±100	  
No-­‐con6ngency	  state	  
2	  
3	  
4	  
5	  6	  
1	  
102.4	  
42.8	  
51.2	  
G1:	  196.4	  
104.78	  
91.62	  
18.91	  2
3.
90
	  
75
.0
9	  
-­‐23.90	  
(a)	   (b)	  
Fig. 1 (a) Single line diagram of the modified 6-bus test system. (b) An optimal BUC solution to the 6-bus
test system, ignoring contingency constraints. Green, blue, and red text respectively refers to characteristics
of generators, lines, and buses.
total demand. The no-contingency economic dispatch is shown graphically in Figure
1(b).
In accordance with NERC’s TPL standard, loss-of-load is not permitted in single-
component-failure contingency states. In order for the 6-bus test system to be fully
N-1 compliant, i.e., to operate the system in such a way that there exists a post-
contingency corrective recourse action for all possible N-1 contingencies, 5 genera-
tion units must be committed, as shown in Figure 2(a). Of these, two units (G1 and
G3) provide generation capacity during the no-contingency state, while three units
(G4, G5, and G6) function as spinning reserves. Unlike the practical approach of ex-
plicitly setting aside spinning reserves (e.g., equivalent to the capacity of the largest
unit) via constraints, our proposed CCUC model implicitly and automatically selects
units to provide spinning reserves, within the context of satisfying contingency con-
straints. Further, in contrast to the approach of explicitly allocating spinning reserves,
our proposed CCUC model guarantees that there is adequate transmission capability
to dispatch the generator outputs during all contingency states.
The optimal N-1-compliant BUC solution shown in Figure 2(a) represents the
system in steady state operations, i.e., under no observed contingency. Figures 2(b)
and 2(c) illustrate feasible corrective recourse power flows for single-component con-
tingency states corresponding to the failure of generation unit 1 and transmission line
1 (connecting buses 1 and 2), respectively. The total operating cost of the N-1 com-
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Fig. 2 (a) An optimal BUC solution to the 6-bus test system that is fully N-1 compliant. (b) A corrective
recourse power flow after the failure of generation unit 1. (c) A corrective recourse power flow after the
failure of the transmission line connecting buses 1 and 2.
pliant solution is approximately 6.52% higher than an optimal no-contingency BUC
solution.
The modified 6-bus system has 13 (7 transmission lines and 6 generators) possi-
ble single-component contingency states. We observe that it is sufficient to consider
only the two contingency states shown in Figure 2(b) and Figure 2(c) in order to
achieve full N-1 compliance. In other words, accounting for those two contingencies
implicitly yields feasible corrective recourse actions for the other N-1 contingency
states. As we discuss in Section 3, in most practical systems only a small number of
contingency states are likely to impact the optimal unit commitment solution. Conse-
quently, we design our algorithm to screen for these critical contingencies implicitly,
without the need to explicitly consider all possible combinations of system compo-
nent failures – thus avoiding the combinatorial explosion in the number of possible
contingencies.
If the maximum allowable contingency size is increased to k = 2, the optimal
BUC solution for the 6-bus test system commits four generation units, as shown in
Figure 3. In addition to including k= 2 contingencies in our analysis, we require that
loads must be fully served in the no-contingency state and that a post-contingency
corrective resource exist for all k = 1 contingencies with zero loss-of-load, per TPL
standards. For all k = 2 contingencies, the allowable loss-of-load threshold is set to
ε2 = 0.27, to ensure that there is sufficient slack to accommodate the loss of both
transmission lines connected to bus 5. If both transmission lines connected to bus 5
fail, then the load at that bus cannot be served; the factor 0.27 corresponds to the
minimal loss-of-load under this contingency. For systems with greater redundancy
and flexibility, such as those presented Section 4, the loss-of-load threshold can be
set more conservatively (i.e., lower).
Of the four committed units, one unit (G1) is producing at maximum capacity and
three units (4, 5, and 6) are producing at at levels below their maximum rating. Taken
together, these three units can provide up to 150MW of spinning reserves. Although
fewer units are committed (4 compared to 5) relative to the N-1 solution, the two least
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Fig. 3 An optimal BUC solution to the 6-bus test system that is fully N-2-ε compliant with ε2 = 0.27
allowable loss-of-load.
expensive units (G1 and G2) are not committed while the three most expensive units
(G4, G5, and G6) are committed in the N-2-ε compliant solution.
We conclude with the obvious, yet critical, observation that contingency con-
straints must be considered in normal (no-contingency) unit commitment operations
in order to ensure that a feasible post-contingency corrective recourse exists for all
contingency states under consideration.
2.4 Contingency-Constrained Unit Commitment Formulation
Given the baseline unit commitment model (BUC) and associated contingency con-
straints as defined respectively in Sections 2.1 and 2.2, we can now describe our full
contingency-constrained unit commitment (CCUC) problem:
CCUC : min
x∈X ∑t∈T ∑g∈G
(cutg + c
dt
g )+Q(x) (5)
s.t. (f,p,q,θ) ∈R(xt , p˜t ,dc) ∀c ∈ C ,∀t ∈T
The resulting unit commitment decision vector x represents a minimal-cost solution
that satisfies (1) the non-contingency demands Dti for each bus i ∈ I for each time
period t ∈ T , (2) the generation unit ramping constraints and startup/shutdown con-
straints, and (3) the network security and DC power flow constraints for each contin-
gency, subject to loss-of-load allowances ε j. We again note that generation costs in-
curred during a contingency are not considered in the objective function. Rather, only
power system feasibility need be maintained, subject to the loss-of-load allowances
ε j, for all j ∈ {1, · · · ,k}.
3 Solution Methods
The extensive formulation (EF) (5) of the CCUC problem is a large-scale MILP, and
has an extremely large number of variables and constraints. For large power systems
and/or non-trivial contingency budgets k, the EF formulation will quickly become
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computationally intractable. For example, the number of constraints in the second
stage of the CCUC (which drives the overall problem size) is approximately given as:
C×T (3I+2E+4G) = O(T × (G+E)k× (I+G+E)).
Alternatively, the EF formulation of the CCUC problem has a structure that is
amenable to a Benders decomposition (BD) approach, which partitions the con-
straints in the EF formulation into (1) a BUC problem prescribing the unit com-
mitment decisions and the corresponding economic dispatch in the no-contingency
state (this is commonly referred to as the master problem in BD), and (2) a subprob-
lem corresponding to each contingency feasibility check, for each contingency state
c ∈ C and time period t ∈T . The BD algorithm iterates between solving the master
problem (BUC), to prescribe the lowest cost unit commitment and economic dispatch,
and the linear subproblems, until an optimal solution with a feasible post-contingency
corrective recourse for all contingency states is obtained. In the following sub-section,
we describe our Benders decomposition solution method, as it is applied to CCUC.
3.1 A Benders Decomposition Approach
We begin by observing that given a time period t, a unit commitment decision xt and
the no-contingency generation schedule p˜t , feasibility under contingency state c, as
prescribed by d˜c, is contingent on satisfying the following DC power flow constraints.
We refer to this problem as the contingency feasibility problem CF(xt , p˜t , d˜c). For
conciseness of notation, we eliminate the superscript “ct” from the f cte , p
ct
g ,q
ct
i and
θ cti decision variables.
(α) ∑
g∈Gi
pg+ ∑
e∈E.i
fe− ∑
e∈Ei.
fe+qi = Dti ∀i ∈I (6a)
(β ) Be(θie −θ je)(1− d˜ce)− fe = 0 ∀e ∈ E (6b)
(δˆ ) fe ≤ Fe∆ |c|e (1− d˜ce) ∀e ∈ E (6c)
(δˇ ) − fe ≤ Fe∆ |c|e (1− d˜ce) ∀e ∈ E (6d)
(γ) pg ≤ Pmaxg xtg(1− d˜cg) ∀g ∈ G (6e)
(λˆ ) pg ≤ Rug∆ |c|g + p˜tg ∀g ∈ G (6f)
(λˇ ) − pg ≤ (Rdg∆ |c|g − p˜tg)(1− d˜cg) ∀g ∈ G (6g)
(ζ ) qi ≤ Dti ∀i ∈I (6h)
(pi) ∑
i∈I
qi ≤ ε|c|Dt (6i)
pg,qi ≥ 0 ∀g ∈ G , i ∈I . (6j)
Using the dual variables associated with each constraint set in (6a)-(6i), we have,
by strong duality in linear programming, that (xt , p˜t , d˜c) is feasible if and only if the
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following dual problem DCF(xt , p˜t , d˜c) is bounded:
max
α,β ,δˆ ,δˇ ,γ,λˆ ,λˇ ,ζ ,pi
∑
i∈I
Dti(αi+ζi)+ ∑
e∈E
Fe∆
|c|
e (1− d˜ce)(δˇe+ δˆe)+ ∑
g∈G
Pmaxg x
t
g(1− d˜cg)γg
(7a)
+ ∑
g∈G
(
(Rug∆
|c|
g + p˜tg)λˆg+(R
d
g∆
|c|
g − p˜tg)(1− d˜cg)λˇg+ ε|c|Dtpi
)
s.t. αie −α je −βe− δˇe+ δˆe = 0 ∀e ∈ E (7b)
αig + γg+ λˆg− λˇg ≤ 0 ∀g ∈ G (7c)
αi+ζi ≤ 0 ∀i ∈I (7d)
∑
e∈Ei.
Be(1− d˜ce)βe− ∑
e∈E.i
Be(1− d˜ce)βe = 0 ∀i ∈I (7e)
δˆ , δˇ ,γ, λˆ , λˇ ,ζ ,pi ≤ 0 (7f)
Note that the feasible domain for DCF(xt , p˜t , d˜c), is a polyhedral cone and any
solution in the domain is a ray. By Minkowski’s theorem, every such ray can be
expressed as a non-negative linear combination of the extreme rays of the domain.
Therefore, the dual problem DCF(xt , p˜t , d˜c) is bounded if and only if its optimal
objective value is less than or equal to zero. And this happens if and only if
∑
i∈I
Dti(αi+ζi)+ ∑
e∈E
Fe∆
|c|
e (1− d˜ce)(δˇe+ δˆe)+ ∑
g∈G
Pmaxg x
t
g(1− d˜cg)γg (8)
+ ∑
g∈G
(
(Rug∆
|c|
g + p˜tg)λˆg+(R
d
g∆
|c|
g − p˜tg)(1− d˜cg)λˇg+ ε|c|Dtpi
)
≤ 0.
We call these the Benders feasibility cuts or f -cut for short. Below we outline the
Benders decomposition algorithm as it applied to CCUC.
Algorithm 1 Benders Decomposition Algorithm (BD)
1: Initialization: let `← 1
2: Solve BUC`
3: if BUC` is infeasible, CCUC has no feasible solution, EXIT
4: else, let (x`, p˜`) be an optimal solution of BUC`
5: for each c ∈ C , t ∈T ,
6: solve CF(xt`, p˜
t
`, d˜
c) and let w∗ be the optimal objective value
7: if w∗ unbounded add f -cut (8) to BUC`
8: end if
9: end for
10: if f -cut(s) added in (7), let `← `+1 and return to (2)
11: else, (x`, p˜t`) is an optimal solution, EXIT
12: end if
13: end if
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3.2 A Cutting Plane Method Based on the Power System Inhibition Problem
Even with a BD approach CCUC may not be tractable for practical size power sys-
tems, since for every contingency c ∈ C and time period t ∈ T , we need to ensure
that a feasible DC power flow with limited loss-of-load exists, which is intractable in
most cases.
In this section, we describe a cutting plane algorithm that uses a bi-level sep-
aration problem to implicitly identify a contingency state that would result in the
worst-case loss-of-load for each contingency size j , j ∈ {1, · · · ,k}. If the worst-case
generation shedding is non-zero and/or loss-of-load is above the given contingency
budget ε j, the current solution is infeasible, and we generate a cutting plane, corre-
sponding to f -cut (8) to add to the BUC to protect against this particular contingency
state.
3.2.1 The Bi-Level Power System Inhibition Problem
Given a time period t ∈T and a contingency budget j ∈ {1, · · · ,k}, unit commitment
xt , and the no-contingency generation levels p˜t , we solve a bi-level power system in-
hibition problem (PSIP), to determine the worst-case generation/load shedding under
a contingency with exactly j failed elements. In the context of PSIP, the contingency
vector d is no longer a parameter but a vector of upper-level decision variables. In
PSIP, the upper-level decisions (d) correspond to binary contingency selection deci-
sions and the lower level decisions (f,p,q,r,s,θ) correspond to recourse generation
schedule and DC power flow under the state prescribed by the the unit commitment
decisions xt , the no-contingency state economic dispatch (p˜t), and upper-level con-
tingency selection variables (d).
Before we introduce the power system inhibition problem (PSIP), we augment
the direct current power flow constraints as follows. We introduce three sets of non-
negative, continuous variables corresponding to generation shedding rg for all g ∈ G ,
loss-of-load at each bus qi for all i∈I and auxiliary variable s corresponding to total
system loss-of-load above the allowable threshold ε jDt . These variables in conjunc-
tion with additional constraints ensure that PSIP has a feasible recourse power flow
for any unit commitment xt , no-contingency state economic dispatch p˜t and upper-
level contingency selection decisions d. We now state the power system inhibition
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problem.
B-PSIP(xt , p˜t , j) :
max
d
min
f,p,q,r,s,θ ∑g∈G
rg+ s (9a)
s.t. ∑
e∈E
de+ ∑
g∈G
dg = j (9b)
∑
g∈Gi
(pg− rg)+ ∑
e∈E.i
fe− ∑
e∈Ei.
fe+qi = Dti ∀i ∈I (9c)
Be(θie −θ je)(1−de)− fe = 0 ∀e ∈ E
(9d)
− fe ≤ Fe∆ je (1−de) ∀e ∈ E (9e)
fe ≤ Fe(1−de)∆ je ∀e ∈ E (9f)
pg ≤ Pmaxg xtg(1−dg) ∀g ∈ G
(9g)
pg ≤ Rug∆ jg + p˜tg ∀g ∈ G
(9h)
− pg ≤ Rdg∆ jg − p˜tg(1−dg) ∀g ∈ G (9i)
qi ≤ Dti ∀i ∈I (9j)
rg− pg ≤ 0 ∀i ∈I
(9k)
∑
i∈I
qi− s≤ ε jDt (9l)
pg ≥ 0, qi ≥ 0, rg ≥ 0, s≥ 0 ∀i ∈I ,g ∈ G
(9m)
de ∈ {0,1}, dg ∈ {0,1} ∀e ∈ E ,∀g ∈ G .
(9n)
The bi-level objective (9a) seeks to maximize, the minimum generation shedding
and loss-of-load quantity above the allowable threshold. Since rg for all g ∈ G and
s are non-negative variables, the objective value is bounded below by zero. If the
objective value is equal to zero, the current solution (xt , p˜t) has a feasible correc-
tive recourse for all contingencies of size j. Otherwise, the current solution cannot
survive the contingency prescribed by upper-level contingency selection variables d.
Given a contingency state defined by d, the objective of the power system operator
(the inner minimization problem) is to find a corrective recourse power flow such that
generation shedding and loss-of-load quantity above the allowable threshold is min-
imized. (9b) is a budget constraint on the number of power system elements, gener-
ation and/or transmission, that must be in the selected contingency state. Constraints
(9c) enforce power balance at each bus, with additional generation shedding variables
rg ∈ G for each generator located at a bus and a bus load-shedding variable qi ∈I to
ensure system feasibility. Constraints (9d)-(9j) are as stated in (4). Constraints (9k)
restrict the amount of generation shedding to be at most the generation output for
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each generator g ∈ G . Constraint (9l) defines the amount of load shedding above the
allowable threshold. If ∑i∈I qi > ε|c|Dt then s= ∑i∈I qi− ε|c|Dt , otherwise, s= 0.
Remark 7 Observe that (9d) are nonlinear constraints with terms associated with
products of binary contingency-selection variables (upper level) and continuous volt-
age phase angles variables (lower level); thus, B-PSIP is a bi-level, nonlinear pro-
gram.
Remark 8 Observe that B-PSIP is feasible for any first-stage solution (xt , p˜t) and any
contingency prescribed by d; the solution f= 0,pt = rt = p˜t ,qt = Dt , s= (1− ε j)Dt
and θ = 0 is feasible under any contingency state.
Bi-level programs, such as (9), cannot be solved directly. Next, we describe a
reformulation strategy to derive a mixed-integer linear programming equivalent for
B-PSIP. We begin by fixing the upper level variables d and dualizing the inner mini-
mization problem. This results in a single-level, bilinear program with bilinear terms
in the objective function. In the resulting reformulation, there are five nonlinear terms,
which are products of binary contingency selection variables (de,dg) and continuous
dual variables (β , δˆ , δˇ ,γ, λˇ ). Each of these non-linear terms can be linearized using
the following strategy.
Let u and v be two continuous variables and b ∈ {0,1}. Then the bilinear term,
(1−b)u, can be linearized as follows. Letting v= (1−b)u, we introduce the follow-
ing four constraints to linearize the bilinear term (1−b)u.
u−Ub ≤ v ≤ u+Ub (10a)
−U(1−b) ≤ v ≤ U(1−b) (10b)
Here, parameter U represents an upper bound for continuous variable u and satisfies
U ≥ |u|. Assessing these constraints for both binary values of b shows that they pro-
vide a linearization. If b = 1, then constraint (10b) implies that v = 0. With v = 0,
constraints (10a) implies that −U ≤ u ≤U , which are never binding. If b = 0, then
constraints (10a) implies u= v and constraint (10b) implies −U ≤ v≤U , which are
never binding.
Remark 9 If the bilinear term is a product of a binary variable b and a non-positive
variable u, i.e. u ≤ 0, the lower bound in (10b) is redundant, and thus, can be elim-
inated. Analogously, if u is a non-negative variable, i.e. u ≥ 0, the upper bound in
(10b) is redundant, and thus, can be eliminated.
We follow a similar strategy to linearize all five bilinear terms (β , δˆ , δˇ ,γ, λˇ ). De-
fine continuous variables (r1,r1,r3,r4,r5) and let r1e = (1− de)βe, r2e = (1− de)δˆe,
r3e = (1−de)δˇe, r4g = (1−dg)γg and r5g = (1−dg)λˇg. Following the same linearization
strategy introduced above, we now state the full mixed-integer linear PSIP formula-
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tion for completeness.
max
d,α,β ,δˆ ,δˇ ,γ,λˆ ,λˇ ,ζ ,pi
∑
i∈I
Dti(αi+ζi)+ ∑
e∈E
Fe∆ je (r
2
e + r
3
e)+ ∑
g∈G
Pmaxg x
t
gr
4
gγg (11a)
+ ∑
g∈G
(
(Rug∆
j
g + p˜
t
g)λˆg+(R
d
g∆
j
g − p˜tg)r5g+ ε jDtpi
)
s.t. ∑
e∈E
de+ ∑
g∈G
dg = j (11b)
αie −α je −βe− δˇe+ δˆe = 0 ∀e ∈ E (11c)
αig + γg+ λˆg− λˇg ≤ 0 ∀g ∈ G (11d)
αi+ζi ≤ 0 ∀i ∈I (11e)
−αig +ηg ≤ 1 ∀g ∈ G (11f)
−pi ≤ 1 (11g)
∑
e∈Ei.
Ber1e − ∑
e∈E.i
Ber1e = 0 ∀i ∈I (11h)
r1e ≥max{βe−Ude,−U(1−de)} ∀e ∈ E (11i)
r1e ≤min{βe+Ude,U(1−de)} ∀e ∈ E (11j)
r2e ≥max{δˆe−Ude,−U(1−de)} ∀e ∈ E (11k)
r2e ≤ δˆe+Ude ∀e ∈ E (11l)
r3e ≥max{δˇe−Ude,−U(1−de)} ∀e ∈ E (11m)
r3e ≤ δˇe+Ude ∀e ∈ E (11n)
r4g ≥max{γg−Udg,−U(1−dg)} ∀g ∈ G (11o)
r4g ≤ γg+Udg ∀g ∈ G (11p)
r5g ≥max{λˇ −Udg,−U(1−dg)} ∀g ∈ G (11q)
r5g ≤ λˇ +Udg ∀g ∈ G (11r)
δˆ , δˇ ,γ, λˆ , λˇ ,ζ ,pi ≤ 0 (11s)
Next, we outline an algorithm for optimally solving problem CCUC that com-
bines a Benders decomposition with the aid of an oracle given by (11), which acts as
a separation problem. A given solution (xt , p˜t) is feasible if the oracle cannot find a
contingency of size j that results in a loss-of-load above the allowable threshold. That
is, if the optimal objective value is zero. For each contingency budget ( j = 1, · · · ,k),
we can check for the worst-case j-element contingencies by solving (11) using a
failure budget of j (i.e. the right-hand side of inequality (11b) is set to j, as it is
right now). Whenever the oracle determines that the current solution is not N-k-ε
compliant, it returns a contingency state, prescribed by d, that results in a genera-
tion shedding and/or loss-of-load, above the allowable threshold ε jDt for j-element
failures.
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Fig. 4 Average run times (sec.) of PSIP for varies power systems and contingency budgets (k = 1,2,3).
3.2.2 Contingency Screening Algorithms
We now present a cutting plane algorithm, referred to as the Contingency Screen-
ing Algorithm 1 (CSA1) to solve CCUC implicitly by screening for the worst-case
contingency, in terms of total generation and load shedding.
Algorithm 2 Contingency Screening Algorithm 1 (CSA1)
1: Initialization: let `← 1
2: Solve BUC`
3: if BUC` is infeasible, CCUC has no feasible solution, EXIT
4: else, let (x`, p˜`) be an optimal solution of BUC`
5: for all j ∈ {1, · · · ,k}, t ∈T ,
6: solve PSIP(xt`, p˜
t
`, j) and let w
∗ be the optimal objective value
7: if w∗ > 0,
8: Add f -cut (8) to BUC`
9: end if
10: end for
11: if f -cut(s) added in (7), let `← `+1 and return to (2)
12: else, (x`, p˜`) is an optimal N-k-ε compliant solution, EXIT
13: end if
14: end if
3.2.3 Contingency Sharing Using a Dynamic Contingency List
In preliminary testing using CSA1, we found that run time is significantly impacted
by the need to solve a large number of PSIP instances at each master iteration of the
algorithm. Specifically, we solve one instance of PSIP for each contingency-size and
period pair ( j, t) for each master iteration. The solution time of PSIP, as expected,
is heavily impacted by the size of the power system (I ,G ,E ). Figure 4 shows the
solution time (on a logarithmic scale) of PSIP for various power system sizes and
maximum contingency budgets k.
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In solving CCUC using CSA1 we also made three observations. First, the ma-
jority of the the total run-time was spent solving PSIP (11) instances. Secondly, a
contingency c that fails the system in one time period t often fails the system in
other time times as well, which suggests sharing of contingencies across time peri-
ods. Thirdly, in the final solution only a small number of contingencies are actually
identified. That is to say, it is often prudent to consider a small number of contin-
gencies explicitly in solving CCUC. Based on these observations, we found that it is
most efficient to develop a version of the CSA algorithm that minimizes the number
times we solve PSIP (11) instances and allows for sharing of contingencies across
time periods. We achieve this buy using a dynamic contingency list.
We begin with an empty contingency list L. At each master iteration, we first
screen all contingencies in the list for each time period t ∈ T . For each time period
t, we generate feasibility cuts (8) for each violated contingency in the list. If none of
the contingencies in the list is violated in any time period t, we proceed to solving
PSIP instances to identify a new violated contingency. This simple procedure ensures
that each violated contingency identified by solving PSIP is never redundant. That
is to say, the new contingency is not in our existing contingency list. When a new
contingency is identified, we add it to the contingency list and check for its viola-
tion in all other time periods by solving a linear DCF problem. Our computational
results indicate that this procedure results in the fewest total PSIP instances solved
on average, which results in the fastest run time. The key idea is that this procedure
avoids redundant PSIP solutions to re-identify violated contingencies. This algorithm
is referred to as the Contingency Screening Algorithm 2 (CSA2).
Algorithm 3 Contingency Screening Algorithm 2 (CSA2)
1: Initialization: `← 1, L= /0
2: Solve BUC`
3: if BUC` is infeasible, CCUC has no feasible solution, EXIT
4: else, let (x`, p˜`) be an optimal solution of BUC`
5: for each c ∈ C , t ∈T ,
6: solve CF(xt`, p˜
t
`,d
c) and let w∗ be the optimal objective value
7: if w∗ > 0,
8: Add f -cut (8) to BUC`
9: end if
10: end for
11: if f -cut(s) added in step (7)
12: let `← `+1, return to step (2)
13: end if
14: for all j ∈ {1, · · · ,k}, t ∈T ,
15: solve PSIP(xt`, p˜
t
`, j) and let z
∗ be the optimal objective value
16: if z∗ > 0, add f -cut (8) to BUC`
17: let `← `+1, L← L∪{c}, return to step (2)
18: end if
19: end for
20: end if
21: (x˜`, p˜`) is an optimal N-k-ε compliant solution, EXIT
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4 Computational Experiments
We implemented our proposed models and algorithms in C++ using IBM’s Concert
Technology Library 2.9 and CPLEX 12.1 MILP solver. All experiments were per-
formed on a workstation with two quad-core, hyper-threaded 2.93GHz Intel Xeon
processors with 96GB of memory. This yields a total of 16 threads allocated to each
invocation of CPLEX. The default behavior of CPLEX 12.1 is to allocate a number
of threads equal to the number of machine cores. In the case of hyper-threaded ar-
chitectures, each core is presented as a virtual dual-core – although it is important
to note that the performance is not equivalent to a true dual core. The workstation is
shared by other users, such that our run-time results should be interpreted as conser-
vative. With the exception of the optimality gap, which we set to 0.1%, we used the
CPLEX default settings for all other parameters. All runs were allocated a maximum
of 10,800 seconds (3 hours) of wall clock time.
We executed our models and algorithms on five test systems of varying size: the
6-bus, IEEE 24-bus, RTS-96, and IEEE 118-bus test systems [14], and a simplified
model of the US Western interconnection (WECC-240)[23]. The 6-bus system de-
scribed in Section 2.3 is further augmented with three fast ramping generation units
located at bus 1, 2, and 6, respectively, to ensure there is sufficient generation capacity
for larger-size contingencies. Generator data for these three units are identical to G4-
G6 in Table 2.3. To ensure there is sufficient operational flexibility in the WECC-240
system, we made eight transmission lines and one generation unit immune to failures.
These nine elements include serial lines, pairs of transmission lines, and generation
unit and transmission line pairs, whose failure would result in islanding of subsystems
(buses). Additionally, we assume that non-dispatchable generation injections into the
system can be shed during contingency states. For each test system, we consider a 24
hour planning horizon and the four contingency budgets k = 0,1,2, and 3, yielding a
total of 20 instances.
We first consider the run-times for the three different algorithms for solving the
CCUC problem: the extensive form MILP, Benders decomposition, and the Con-
tingency Screening Algorithm 2 (CSA2). The results are presented in Table 5. All
times are reported in wall clock (elapsed) seconds. The column labeled “C” reports
the number of distinct contingencies for a given budget k, while the column labeled
“εk” reports the fraction of total load (demand) that can be shed. Entries in Table 5
reporting “x” indicate that the corresponding algorithm failed to locate a N-k-ε com-
pliant solution within the 0.1% optimality gap within the 3 hour time limit. For those
instances that could not be solved within the allocated time, we provide exit status
or feasibility gaps, indicating the maximum fraction of total demand shed above the
allowable threshold εk in the final solution. In all runs of the CSA2 algorithm, we
initialize the contingency list L to the empty list.
As expected, the extensive form approach (EF) can only solve the smallest in-
stances, since for each contingency, a full set of DC power flow constraints (4) must
be explicitly embedded in the formulation. As the number of contingencies grows,
this formulation quickly becomes intractable. The exit status “LPR” and “OM” rep-
resent “solving Linear Programming Relaxation at root node” and “Out of Memory”,
respectively. Note that our test instances only represent small to at most moderate
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Table 5 Runtimes for different solution approaches to the CCUC problem
Solution time
(exit status or feasibility gap)
Test System C k εk EF BD CSA2
6-bus 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 1 0 3 2 1
136 2 0.29 7 16 2
696 3 0.77 134 189 4
IEEE 24-bus 0 0 0 0 1 0
70 1 0 108 58 11
2,485 2 0.08 x(LPR) 3,861 101
57,225 3 0.21 x(OM) x(0.03) 397
RTS-96 0 0 0 1 2 2
216 1 0 x(LPR) 303 41
23,436 2 0.05 x(OM) 8,139 4,04
1,679,796 3 0.09 x(OM) x(0.050) 4,989
IEEE 118-bus 0 0 0 1 1 1
240 1 0.01 x(LPR) 3,513 352
28,920 2 0.12 x(OM) x(0.204) 1,232
2,304,200 3 0.25 x(OM) x(0.249) 8,586
WECC-240 0 0 0 1 2 2
424 1 0 x(LPR) 262 108
90,100 2 0.06 x(OM) x(0.004) 2,484
12,704,524 3 0.15 x(OM) x(0.004) x(0)
sized systems relative to real power systems (which can contain on the order of thou-
sands to tens of thousands of elements), indicating that even significant advances in
solver technology are unlikely to mitigate this issue. Further, even given significant
algorithmic advances, the memory requirements associated with the EF will likely
cause the intractability to persist.
The BD approach attempts to address the exponential, as shown in Remark 6, ex-
plosion in the number of contingencies via a Benders reformulation/decomposition,
with corresponding delayed cut generation. However, although the BD approach does
not explicitly incorporate power flow constraints (4) for each contingency into the
formulation, those power flow constraints must still be solved to identify violated
feasibility cuts (which are then added to the master problem). In summary, the BD
approach mitigates the memory issues associated with the EF approach, but the cost
of identifying feasibility violations for a rapidly growing number of contingencies
remains prohibitive. Overall, the BD approach can solve larger instances than the EF
approach, but still fails given larger k and larger test instances.
Finally, we consider the performance of our third approach: CSA2. Here, we see
that all of our test instances, with the sole exception of the WECC-240 system with
k = 3, can be solved within the 3 hour time limit. This result is enabled by the com-
bination of using a dynamic contingency list (significantly reducing the number of
PSIP solves) and the fact that we are able to implicitly evaluate all the contingencies
in order to identify a violated contingency, and then quickly find a corresponding
feasibility cut by solving a single linear program (DCF). These features of the CSA2
algorithm allow it to mitigate the effects of a combinatorial number of contingen-
cies and the associated impact on run-times and memory requirements. Lastly, we
note that although CPA2 failed to solve the WECC-240 system with k= 3 within the
allocate time, the final solution at the three hour mark is in fact a N-k-ε compliant
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Table 6 Runtime breakout for the CSA2 algorithm
Test Systems C k εk RMP PSIP DCF itr |L| cuts
6-bus 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
16 1 0 0 1 0 2 1 21
136 2 0.29 0 2 0 7 3 48
696 3 0.77 0 4 0 11 4 89
IEEE 24-bus 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
70 1 0 6 46 1 185 1 185
2,485 2 0.08 26 69 6 857 3 857
57,225 3 0.21 64 324 9 928 4 928
RTS-96 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0
216 1 0 13 25 3 12 3 27
23,436 2 0.05 17 385 2 15 4 33
1,679,796 3 0.09 19 4,965 5 17 5 38
IEEE 118-bus 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
240 1 0.01 243 72 37 85 5 1,305
28,920 2 0.12 377 796 59 120 7 1,671
2,304,200 3 0.25 405 8,114 67 132 9 1,743
WECC 240-bus 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
424 1 0 4 102 2 5 2 48
90,100 2 0.06 3 2,479 2 5 2 48
12,704,524 3 0.15 x x x x x x
solution. For large power systems and/or contingency budgets, significant computa-
tional time is required to “prove” feasibility. Eliminating the three hour time limit, we
observed that the WECC-240 system with k= 3 could be solved in approximately 18
hours, with the majority of this time taken to prove feasibility of the final solution.
We next examine the run-times of our CSA2 algorithm in further detail, as re-
ported in Table 6. For each instance, we report the total number of possible contin-
gency states C and the number of contingencies for which corresponding feasibility
cuts were actually generated. The latter corresponds to the final size of the dynamic
contingency list, which is reported in the column labeled “|L|”. Clearly, |L| cor-
responds to a vanishingly small fraction of the possible number of contingencies,
which is critical to the tractability of the approach. The remaining columns of Table 6
break down the total run time (in wall clock seconds) by the three main components
of the algorithm – the RMP, which identifies unit commitments; the power system
inhibition problem (PSIP), which identifies a contingency that has no feasible correc-
tive recourse power flow given the current RMP UC decisions and no-contingency
economic dispatch; and the contingency feasibility subproblems (DCF), which yield
the feasibility cuts. The final column, labeled “cuts”, reports the total number of fea-
sibility cuts generated in solving the instance. It is clear from Table 6 that the com-
putational bottleneck in the CSA2 algorithm is the solution of the PSIP, such that any
improvements to that process will yield immediate reductions in CSA2 run-times.
5 Conclusions
We have investigated the problem of committing generation units in power system op-
erations, and determining a corresponding no-contingency state economic dispatch,
such that the resulting solution satisfies the N-k-ε reliability criterion. This reliability
criterion is a generalization of the well-known N-k criterion, and requires that at least
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(1− ε j) fraction of the total demand is met following the failure of j system compo-
nents, for j ∈ {1, · · · ,k}. We refer to this problem as the contingency-constrained unit
commitment problem, or CCUC. We proposed two algorithms to solve the CCUC:
one based on the Benders decomposition approach, and another based on contingency
screening algorithms. The latter method avoids the combinatorial explosion in the
number of contingencies by seeking vulnerabilities in the current solution, and gen-
erating valid inequalities to exclude such infeasible solutions in the master problem.
We tested our proposed algorithms on test systems of varying sizes. Computational
results show our proposed Contingency Screening Algorithm (CSA2), which uses a
bi-level separation program to implicitly consider all contingencies and a dynamic
contingency list to avoid re-identification of contingencies, significantly outperforms
the Benders decomposition approach. We were able to solve all test systems, with
the exception of the largest WECC-240 instance, in under 3 hours. In contrast, both
the Benders decomposition algorithm and a straightforward solution of the CCUC
extensive form, failed to solve all but the smallest instances within 3 hours.
We believe that this paper will provide a significant basis for subsequent research
in contingency-constrained unit commitment. For example, we are working to ap-
ply these methods to full-scale systems. While our results are promising in terms
of scalability, full-scale problems pose more significant computational challenges,
and consequently will require stronger formulations for the power system inhibition
problem and possible adoption of high-performance computing resources. Further,
our current CCUC model assumes all component failures occur simultaneously. In
order to reflect practical operational situations, where failures may happen consecu-
tively, new CCUC models that consider timing between system component failures
are needed. We plan to extend our CCUC models to include these cases. Finally, we
worked exclusively with a deterministic CCUC model to date. However, it is ulti-
mately essential to take uncertainty into account in unit commitment, e.g., to account
for uncertain demand and renewable generation units. We believe our current cut-
ting plane framework can be naturally extended to robust optimization and stochastic
programming formulations via a nested decomposition approach.
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